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BOOKS REVIEWED
Church-State Relationships in America. By Gerald V. Bradley. Contributions
to Legal Studies, Number 37. New York: Greenwood Press, 1987. xiv., 166 pp.
First Amendment of the United States Constitution contains a deceptively
simple formulation of the nation's fundamental law governing relations be-
tween church and state: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." Since the English
colonies in North America were founded in large part by refugees from relig-
ious intolerance and oppression on the other side of the Atlantic, the pursuit
of religious liberty was already a venerable motif in American history when
the First Amendment was ratified in 1789. Hence, both the Establishment
Clauses and the Free Exercise Clause carry with them a deeply-rooted mythic
significance, but the constitutional language itself conveys far less than a de-
tailed legal blueprint of the proper relationship between religion and the appara-
tus of government. Since the Everson decision in 1947, the Supreme Court
has relied very heavily on historical arguments of religion by law was intend-
ed to erect 'a wall of separation between church and state.' " Under the cur-
rent Supreme Court doctrine first articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, any state
or federal government action violates the Establishment Clause if the action
is intended to advance a religious rather than a secular purpose, if the action
has the effect of advancing religion, or if the action results in excessive en-
tanglement between government and religion. The Court has exempted from
the coverage of the Lemon test certain government programs that have the
intention and the effect of advancing religion, but that also carry the historical
pedigree of having been created or carried forward by the same founding
fathers who drafted or voted to approve the First Amendment.
Professor Bradley's book is the latest addition to a rapidly expanding liter-
ature criticizing the Supreme Court's historical reading of the First Amend-
ment and the justices' vision of the proper relationship between government
and religion. Many commentators have derided the Lemon test as a doctrine
devoid of any principled content and incapable of consistent application. Even
some members of the Court, in their more lucid moments, have conceded
that current Establishment Clause doctrine yields no predictability about the
outcomes of actual cases.
This volume, despite'the grand sweep of its title, actually mounts a much
narrower attack on the Court's Establishment Clause jurispurdence. Most of
the book consists of an historical study aimed at disproving the Supreme
Court's pronouncement that the original understanding of the First Amend-
ment was that his restriction on government would erect a wall of separation.
between church and state. But Bradley's agenda neither begins nor ends with
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an accurate historical reading of the Establishment Clause. The author's pur-
pose is polemical. He refutes the Supreme Court's historical conclusions for
the express purpose of convincing his readers that sect-neutral governmental
aid to religion is perfectly consonant with the Establishment Clause.
To those who are familiar with the cases in this area of constitutional law,
Bradley's historical argument will look as if it essentially reiterates and amplifies
Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Wallace v. Jaffree. The bulk of this book con-
sists of a strenuous "original intent" assault upon the Everson Court's orig-
inalist arguments in favor of the wall of separation between church and state.
Further, Bradley's historical argument challenges the currently fashionable
view that "there is no clear history as to the meaning of the [religion] clauses."
Nowak, Rotunda, and Young, Constitutional Law 3rd ed. 1986, p. 1031. In
fact, Bradley has assembled a very powerful case against the theory that the
original understanding of the Establishment Clause amounted to anything like
a wall of separation. The analysis begins with a survey of the pattern of church-
state relations that existed in each of the states during the founding era. While
some states, most notably in Congregationalist New England, continued to
maintain an established religion into the nineteenth century, many states ex-
perienced the disestablishment of Anglicanism during the Revolutionary War.
From these disestablishment states, Bradley has pieced together a convincing
argument that during the founding era, "establishment" meant that the state
enforced the hegemony of a single sect, while "disestablishment" meant gov-
ernmental neutrality as among Protestant sects. Governments in non-
establishment states cheerfully saddled papists, Jews, and non-believers with
various disabilities, while routinely rendering aid to the religious groups that
huddled together beneath the "sacred canopy" of Protestantism. Disestablish-
ment in 1789 did not mean, and could not have meant, governmental neutrality
as between religion and irreligion.
Bradley next turns to the ratification of the Constitution, in order to prove
that the First Amendment marked no departure from the previously widely
accepted notions of establishment and disestablishment. This argument directly
challenges Justice Black's historical fairy-tale in Everson, in which the First
Amendment supposedly marked a revolutionary departure from a colonial
history replete with intolerance, oppression, and persecution. Bradley's re-
joinder to Justice Black is a survey of the ratification process, beginning in
1788 with the Antifederalists' resistance to adopting the Constitution. Bradley
devotes a chapter to the states' demands for restraints upon federal power
over religion, another to the congressional drafting of the First Amendment's
religion clauses, and a third to the states' ratification of the text that was
to define the relationship between the federal government and religion in
America. It is absolutely clear that neither the state nor the Congress intended
to depart from the existing meaning of non-establishment. What emerges most
powerfully from the historical narrative is a widespread federalist concern that
the national government be forced to abstain from interfering with the states'
varied regimes of establishment or disestablishment. Where the federal govern-
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ment ruled directly, as in the Northwest Territory, the First Amendment
operated to require non-establishment as commonly understood, that is, to
permit governmental support for religion on a sect-neutral basis. Insofar as
the religion clauses represented primarily a constraint on the federal govern-
ment vis-a-vis the states, Bradley makes the point that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment cannot by any operation of logic have subsequently incorporated the
Establishment clause as a restraint upon the powers of state governments.
The historical evidence collected in this book is devastating to the naive
and over-broad historical arguments employed by the Supreme Court in sup-
port of its Establishment Clause jurisprudence since Everson. If Bradley's
agenda had proceeded no further than to underscore the unreliability of the
Court's historical claims, the worst criticism that one could level at Bradley's
work might be a charge of intemperance. Contrary to Bradley's belief, the
justices have probably not been dishonest so much as they have been prone
to jump at whatever historical evidence tends to support their a priori posi-
tions and to employ that evidence carelessly, without regard for context. The
justices, if they ever do respond to criticism from academic commentators,
might learn a valuable lesson from the embarrassment that should follow from
the disrobing of Everson's history: he (or she) who ventures an historical in-
terpretation of a legal text bears the burden of proving that the interpretation
is accurate in light of all the known historical context. Citing a convenient
phrase or two from Jefferson, or Madison is a slipshod form of persuasion
that does not create a credible basis for a stable, enduring jurisprudence.
Unfortunately, Bradley's argument does not stop with the conclusion that
the Supreme Court has crossed its historical wires. Instead, Bradley charges
headlong from his carefully built-up premise, that "no establishment" in 1789
meant sect-neutral governmental support for religion, to the wondrously wrong-
headed conclusion that there now remains no argument for a constitutional
ban upon governmental aid to religion, so long as such support remains sect-
neutral. This kind of flight from originalist interpretation steeped in the con-
text of 1789 to constitutional pronouncements for 1987 and the future is the
kind of argument that gives legal historians a bad name. Simply because the
Court's historical arguments in Everson and its progeny have been discredited,
it does not follow that the legal conclusions reached in those cases were
necessarily incorrect, but rather that the bases for the decisions must be re-
examined to discover whether the Court's analysis can be supported without
the historical props. During the past forty years, the Court has been examin-
ing the relationship between religion and government in a social context much
changed from the one that gave the original meaning to the First Amend-
ment's religion clauses. The state has displaced religious corporations as the
primary purveyor of education, health care for the indigent, and poor relief.
Religion itself has become ever more amorphous as a social and legal category.
Assuming that one were to accept Bradley's conclusion and were to permit
sect-neutral governmental support for religion, could a state support, for ex-
ample, Protestant schools, Catholic schools, and Jewish schools without sup-
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porting Unification Church schools, or secular humanist schools, or schools
for the advancement of atheism? On what non-discriminatory basis would
it be possible to distinguish between "real" religion and "fake" or non-
religion? More disturbing still is Bradley's assumption that the universal, un-
.challenged preference for religion over irreligion in 1789 is still warranted in
1987. Just as the Supreme Court's fears of sectarian strife have proved to
be a sort of jurisprudential bogey-man, without foundation in reality, so too
the founders' conviction that tolerating unbelief would lead immediately to
the dissolution of society. What now remains of the founding generation's
belief in the need for governmental aid to religion? How might government
pursue those goals without invidious discrimination against those individuals
who expressly profess disbelief in religion? Can the government go any far-
ther than merely accommodating religious believers, without encroaching upon
the free exercise rights of disbelievers? Admittedly, the Court has addressed
these issues with inconsistency and vacillation as to whether we are a people
who place a positive value upon religious belief or a people who do not
discriminate between belief and disbelief. Bradley has simply ignored the hard
questions.
Reasonable people will continue to disagree over the direction that the
Supreme Court should take with regard to church and state in America.
Reputable scholars will continue to disagree with one another over the ques-
tion of whether some of the framers might have intended to erect a wall of
separation between religion and government, and if so, what might be the
present-day legal significance of that intention. What is clear is that the vast
majority of the founding generation did not believe or intend that the First
Amendment's prohibition of establishment would require any departure from
sect-neutral governmental support for Protestant belief. Bradley is right to
insist that the Court must abandon the discredited historical rationale that
has served as the basis for Establishment Clause jurisprudence since Everson.
Bradley does not make a convincing argument that the wall of separation
must be torn down, but he does leave those who would maintain the wall
in need of a new foundation.
Richard M. Fraher
HUMAN RIGHTS: FACT OR FANCY? By Henry B. Veatch. Baton Rouge and
London: Louisiana State University Press, 1985.
In the marketplace of ideas, the currency of contemporary legal, political,
and ethical commerce is clearly the Right, not as in Rights and Wrongs, but
as in Rights and Duties, and among the various denominations of Rights in
circulation at present, the Human Right is clearly preferred over the others.
The question presented in Human Rights: Fact or Fancy? is not whether human
